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ABSTRACT:
In this paper, we study the relationship between the market struture in the real setor and
the eets of insider trading. Speially, we analyze two models, one in whih the insider is a
prie-hoosing monopolist in the real setor and the other in whih he is a Cournot duopolist.
The aim is to study the eets of dierent market strutures in the real setor on the real and
nanial eets of insider trading by the manager. We nd that the market struture in the real
setor matters. When the monopolist insider hooses the prie of the real good rather than the
output, insider trading inreases the prie rather than the quantity. When the insider ompetes
with another rm in the real setor, and hooses quantity, the output inreases due to insider
trading but by less than in monopoly models. In addition, the stok prie is more informative
than in monopoly models. Finally, the ompetition with another rm in the real setor redues
the insider's prots from nanial transations below that in monopoly models.
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1. INTRODUCTION:
The debate on the eet, as well as the value, of trading on nanial markets by agents who
have inside information has a long history. Muh of the debate has entered on two issues. The
rst is fairness: should an individual who has inside information about the ativities of a rm be
able to trade on that information at the expense of individuals without that information? The
seond deals with the dissemination of information. For eÆient markets it is neessary that all
information be disseminated and then evaluated by all agents. It is argued that the role of the
insider is to help disseminate information and therefore the gain of the insider is merely a payo
to releasing this private information. Indeed, this informational eet is preisely what has been
aptured by Kyle (1985) in his seminal work on insider trading. However, there is another eet of
insider trading, namely, the relationship between the nanial deisions made by the insider and
the `real' ativities of the rm. In partiular, the insider's ability to make real deisions aets the
nanial markets just as insider trading aets the real output and the prie of the good.
The question of the relationship between the real and nanial eets of insider trading has
been studied reently in Jain and Mirman (2000) (heneforth, JM) in the ontext of Kyle's model
of insider trading. In Kyle's model, the insider is assumed to know the value of the rm (whih
is drawn from a normal distribution) but has no eet on the deisions of the rm. In JM, the
insider is modelled as a manager, as well as a trader in the stok, of the rm. In this way, the
manager an inuene the real deisions of the rm hanging the value of the rm in the nanial
markets, while maximizing his own prots on the nanial market. This manipulation has an eet
on the rm' prot and thus on its `real' value. The market valuation of the rm is determined by
a perfetly ompetitive market maker, who in Kyle's model sees only the order ow of the insider
and the noise traders. However, in JM, the market maker also sees other soures of information,
e.g. the rm's prie in the real setor may be publi information and ontain valuable signals for
priing the stok. In JM, the insider is a quantity-setting monopolist and sets a quantity higher
(and average prie lower) than would a monopolist without insider trading.
Despite the fat that there is an important relationship between real and nanial market
variables in JM, the result that output is higher due to insider trading must be interpreted arefully.
In JM, there is an important relationship between the `real' signal (a prie observation in JM) and
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the inentive for the rm to produe more in order to signal a lower value of the rm and therefore
a lower stok prie, enabling the insider to make higher prots. Indeed, it is the purpose of this
paper to show that the market struture and the `real' signal observed by the market maker are
important in determining the real and nanial eets of insider trading.
We rene the results obtained in JM by examining the role of the market struture in the
real setor. In partiular, we show that the real eet of insider trading is sensitive to the type of
market struture in whih the rm operates and the signals available to the market maker from
the real setor. We also show that inreased ompetition in the real setor (for example, duopoly)
hanges the stok priing funtion signiantly and makes the stok prie even more informative
than in the monopoly models (of Kyle and JM). Finally, the inreased information release has
the eet of lowering the prots of the insider ompared to JM and models in whih the market
maker sees only the total order ow (heneforth, the Kyle-type models). The omparison with JM
is interesting sine it implies that the ompetition in real setor leads to lower prots from the
nanial setor, thus emphasising the informational link between the two setors. The omparison
with Kyle-type models reinfores the result in JM that the insider's inability to manipulate the
signal from the real setor leads to a higher information revelation and lower prots.
In this paper, we present two models of insider trading based on two dierent market stru-
tures in the real setor. The purpose is to study the eet of market struture on how insider
trading aets the real as well as the nanial variables. In the rst model, the insider is the
manager of the rm whose stok he trades. As manager, he hooses the prie of the real good that
the rm produes, rather than the output as in JM. The rm is assumed to be monopolisti. In
the nanial market, the market maker sets the prie of the stok based on the prior distribution
of the value of the rm as well as two signals that he observes. One signal is provided by the total
stok order ow, made up of the manager's order and the noise trade. The other signal is observed
in the real setor, whih is a noisy observation of the quantity produed by the manager. This is
also in ontrast to JM where the real setor signal is a noisy observation of the prie of the real
good.
We nd that the average equilibrium output is lower and the prie of the real good higher, a
result opposite to JM. Thus it matters what the monopolist hooses and what the market maker
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sees and thus the welfare impliations are to be drawn depending on the market struture and the
informational struture.
(3)
In the seond model, the rm, managed by the insider, ompetes with another rm in the
real setor and the insider hooses the quantity to be produed. Thus there is Cournot duopoly
in the real setor. The market maker observes the total order ow and a noisy market prie of
the real good as in JM. Interestingly, we nd that the ompetition in the real setor inuenes the
equilibrium values of the variables in the nanial market. Speially, the stok priing funtion
is dierent in Cournot duopoly in the real setor ompared to the monopoly models. However,
the amount of insider trading remains unhanged. The informativeness of the stok prie is higher
under Cournot duopoly than in either Kyle or JM. Finally, prots of the insider are lower ompared
to JM and a Kyle-type model in whih the market maker only observes the total order ow. Thus
the market struture in the real setor aets the outomes in the nanial setor and the prots
of the insider that are derived from trading in the nanial markets. This result is similar in spirit
to the results of Eaton-Mirman (1991) and Jain-Mirman (2001) in whih segmented markets are
related through the proess of information gathering.
Most of the theoretial literature on insider trading, until reently, fousses on the nanial
market only. Some reent work (See Dow and Rahi (1997), Leland (1992) and Manove (1989)
(4)
)
inorporates real as well as nanial setors in their models of insider trading. However, these
papers are more interested in the issue of fairness than in the question of the relationship between
the real and nanial variables due to insider trading. In partiular, the role of the insider in making
real deisions and thus leading to an interdependene between the real and nanial deisions has
not been analyzed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Setion 2, we present the prie-hoosing
monopolist model of insider trading; in Setion 3, we present the Cournot duopoly model; we
onlude in Setion 4.
(3)
It may seem that allowing the market maker to see the prie of the real good will restore the results of JM.
However, while a noisy prie of the good is a sensible signal when the monopolist hooses output, it is no longer so
when the monopolist hooses prie of the good, as in this paper. This is beause the hoie variable is deterministi
and an be inferred whereas the outome is a result of the interation with the random market demand and thus
ontains valuable information for the market maker. Indeed, one of the points made in this paper is to show that the
equivalene observed in miro theory between the prie- hoosing monopolist and the output-hoosing monopolist
no longer holds when nanial deisions are integrated. See setion 2 for details.
(4)
Ausubel (1990) also studies insider trading but without nanial markets.
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2. MODEL I: PRICE-CHOOSING MONOPOLIST
In this setion, we analyze a model of insider trading in whih the insider hooses the prie
of the real good, produed by the rm, and trades in the rm's stok. The market maker observes
noisy output. We ompare the results with the JM model in whih the insider hooses output in
the real setor and the market maker observes the noisy prie of the good. A ruial dierene
emerges. In our model, insider trading by the manager leads to a higher prie of the real good and
thus a lower real output on average. Although in other respets, the overall avor of the results
is the same, this dierene alls for aution in drawing welfare inferenes from any given model.
The market struture and thus the nature of the information available to the market maker is
important in determining how insider trading aets real variables in the eonomy.
Following JM, we assume one real good and one nanial asset in the eonomy. The real
good is produed by a monopolisti rm managed by the insider and the nanial asset is its stok
that is publily traded. We also assume that the ost of prodution is zero, for onveniene. The
rm is owned and managed by two dierent agents. The owner has no deisions to make in the
model and thus does not enter the analysis expliitly.
The insider hooses the prie of the real good, denoted by q. On the basis of his inside
information, he also trades in the nanial market and thus hooses the stok order. Thus the
insider makes two deisions in this model, a real deision and a nanial deision.
The demand funtion for the real good is given by,
y
0
= (a  bq)z;
where z is assumed to be the private information of the insider/manager and is normally distributed
with mean z and variane 
2
z
, and y
0
is the quantity demanded of the real good.
(5)
The value of the rm per share is,
v = (a  bq)qz  Az; (1)
(5)
Due to the normality of z, y
0
varies from negative innity to positive innity. While this may seem implausible
at rst glane, the results, namely the equilibrium levels of the prie of the real good and the average real output
are onsistent with the results of the output-hoosing market model. The prie-hoosing model of this paper is a
straightforward analogue of the output-hoosing model in an eonomy where demand is stohasti. The negativity
of demand must be aepted in order to work within the linear-normal paradigm of Kyle and obtain simple, intuitive
solutions, linking the real and the nanial setors.
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where the rst term is simply the prot per share and the seond term Az is the ompensation
of the manager per unit of stok.
(6)
A is a positive onstant (taken as given by the insider and
the market maker) to be determined endogenously to ensure the existene of equilibrium.
(7)
Thus
the insider is rewarded for buying the stok and penalized for selling it. The eet of this sheme,
intuitively, is to align the interests of the insider/manager and the owners of the rm. In the
absene of this sheme, for `small', positive values of z, the insider has an inentive to short-sell
the stok and produe innite amount of output. (See JM for more details.)
Information Struture: The insider is assumed to know the realization of z before making
deisions. The market maker knows the distribution of z and observes two signals orrelated with
z. In the spirit of Kyle (1985), the market maker observes the total order ow , i.e.,
 = x+ u;
where the insider's stok order is denoted by x and the noise trade is denoted by u. Noise trade u
is assumed to be independent of z and normally distributed with mean 0 and variane 
2
u
.
In addition to , the market maker also observes a noisy signal from the real setor, in the
spirit of JM. We denote this seond signal by y. Speially, y is given by,
y = (a  bq)(z + );
where  is a random variable distributed normally with mean 0 and variane 
2

and is independent
of the random variables z and u. This signal is to be interpreted as a noisy observation of the
quantity produed by the monopolist. We assume that the market maker does not observe anything
else exept the two signals speied above. We also assume that the insider does not observe either
the signal y or the signal , following Kyle and JM. This assumption is onvenient but not neessary.
(For example see Rohet and Vila, 1994.)
Setting the stok prie funtion:
(6)
The normalization of value of the rm on a per share basis is done in the spirit of Kyle (1985). In ontrast to
Kyle, in our model, the value of the rm is endogenous.
(7)
JM show that a ompensation sheme of this form is needed to ensure the existene of a linear-normal
equilibrium when the real deisions of the insider are analyzed. The same argument applies here. In the absene of
the ompensation sheme, the seond order ondition is not satised for all z and the equilibrium exists if and only
if the mean value of the rm is 0.
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The market maker sets the stok prie ompetitively, as in Kyle. Denoting the stok prie
by p, the zero-expeted-prot ondition redues to,
p = E(v=y; ):
We onjeture that the stok prie is linear in both signals and then verify that the onjeture is
valid. Thus let,
E(v=y; ) = p = 
0
+ 
1
y + 
2
: (2)
The insider's net prots are,
 = E

E
u
[(v   p)x+Azx℄:
We assume that this is what the insider maximizes. That is, the insider is risk neutral.
Substituting for v from (1) and p from (2) into the prot funtion, we obtain,
 = ((a   bq)qz  Az   
0
  
1
(a  bq)z   
2
x)x+Azx:
This redues to,
 = ((a  bq)qz   
0
  
1
(a  bq)z   
2
x)x:
The insider maximizes these prots by hoosing x and q, i.e. the stok trade as well as the prie
of the real good.
Solving for Equilibrium
We now determine the prot-maximizing stok trade and the prie of the real good hosen by
the insider, given the stok priing rule (2). Then we determine the stok priing rule and disuss
the omparative statis.
The rst order onditions of the insider's maximization problem are,
(a  2bq + b
1
)xz = 0;
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and,
(a  bq)qz   
0
  
1
(a  bq)z   2
2
x = 0:
Simplifying yields,
q =
a+ b
1
2b
; (3)
and,
x =
(a  bq)(q   
1
)z   
0
2
2
: (4)
From the linearity of x and non-randomness of q, the following lemma follows.
(8)
Lemma 1: The random variables v, y and  are jointly normally distributed.
Set,
A =
(a  bq)(q   
1
)
2
:
Thus the ompensation of the manager beomes,
C 
(a  bq)(q   
1
)
2
zx:
It will be shown below that A is positive.
We now determine the stok priing rule set by the market maker by solving for 
0
, 
1
and

2
. By Theorem 3.10 of Graybill (1961), it is straightforward to solve for these oeÆients. The
results are summarized in Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 2:
(i)

0
= 0;
(ii)

1
=
a
2
z
b(
2
z
+ 4
2

)
;
(8)
The onditions for joint normality an be easily veried.
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(iii)

2
=
a
2


4b
u
p
(1  k)
3
k;
where
k =

2
z

2
z
+ 4
2

:
Proof: See the Appendix.
Clearly 
1
is positive and less than
a
b
. We selet the positive root for 
2
to satisfy the seond
order onditions for the insider's maximization problem. From Lemma 2, it also follows that the
ompensation paid to the insider per unit of the stok traded, namely, A, is positive (sine 
1
is
less than
a
b
). Thus the insider gets rewarded for buying the stok and penalized for selling it. A
is hosen in order to make 
0
zero. This ensures that the seond order onditions of the insider's
maximization problem are satised. This ondition essentially ensures that the insider does not
run the rm down by hoosing an innite prie of the good and short-selling the stok. In other
words, making 
0
zero has the eet of aligning the interests of the insider/manager and the owners
of the rm. (See JM for details.)
Note that the hange in the real deision variable from output (as in JM) to prie, as here,
does not hange the stok priing funtion at all, exept that the real demand parameters a and
b are parameters of the diret demand funtion rather than the inverse demand funtion. This
implies that as long as the relationship between the hoie variable of the monopolist and the soure
of information to the market maker in the real setor remains unhanged, the nanial variables
do not hange (given monopoly in the real setor).
The next Proposition presents the linear equilibrium of the model. It is straightforward to
verify that the seond order onditions of the insider's maximization problem are satised.
Proposition 1: A linear equilibrium exists. The equilibrium is unique and is haraterized by the
following values of variables x; q and p,
q =
a+ b
1
2b
;
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x =
(a  bq)(q   
1
)z
2
2
;
p = 
1
y + 
2

and
C =
(a  bq)(q   
1
)
2
zx;
(9)
where for
k =

2
z

2
z
+ 4
2

;

1
=
ak
b
;

2
=
a
2


4b
u
p
(1  k)
3
k:

1
2 (0;
a
b
) and 
2
> 0.
Disussion of the Equilibrium: It is useful to reall the results of the output-hoosing monopo-
list model of JM. There, it is shown that real deisions and nanial deisions made by the insider
are interrelated. Speially, the real output inreases due to insider trading and the prie of the
stok varies with the real setor parameters.
Interestingly, while the general avor of the results is the same in the prie-hoosing monop-
olist model presented here, the eet on the real prie and the real output is reversed. Sine 
1
is positive and less than
a
b
, the prie of the real good, q, is higher than it would be without the
nanial deisions that the insider makes. Thus insider trading by the manager has the eet of
inreasing the prie of the real good. The intuition is that a higher prie of the real good leads to
a lower signal y, given the shoks z and . This leads to a lower stok prie when z is positive and
a higher stok prie when z is negative, given the stok prie funtion. In JM, the same intuition
leads to a higher real output. This dierene is due to the fat that in both models, the relationship
between what the insider hooses in the real setor and what the market maker observes in the
real setor is exatly the same. Thus the variable hosen by the insider in the real setor hanges
(9)
Note that the oeÆient of C is a funtion of q, whih in turn is a funtion of the exogenously given parameters
of the demand funtion and the endogenously determined onstant 
1
.
11
in the same diretion in the two models. However, the eonomi eet of this is important. The
analysis of a prie-hoosing monopolist shows that depending on what the market maker observes,
and what the insider hooses, the real prie or the real quantity ould be higher. Thus one must
be areful when drawing welfare inferenes from these models.
However, interestingly, the stok priing funtion and the stok prie and the level of insider
trading are related to the real setor variables in exatly the same way as in the model where the
monopolist hooses output. Thus the eet on the nanial variables of real deisions made by the
insider is exatly the same regardless of the hoie variable.
Exept for the eets on the real output and the prie of the real good (whih are reversed),
the omparative statis in this model are idential to those in JM and thus we omit that disussion.
However, it is worth noting that the stok prie in the prie-hoosing monopolist model presented
here ontinues to be more informative than in Kyle (1985) and Rohet and Vila (1994). Speially,
the variane of the value of the rm onditional on the two signals observed by the market maker
is,
Var(v=q; ) =
(a  b
1
)
2
v
2(a+ b
1
)
:
Note that the oeÆient of 
2
v
is less than half. Now, substituting for 
1
from Lemma 2, we get,
Var(v=q; ) =

2


2
z
+ 2
2


2
v
:
Note that the fration of the unexplained variane varies negatively with the underlying
variability 
2
z
and positively with the variability 
2

in ontrast to the Kyle model where the
amount of information revealed is exatly half of the information possessed by the insider.
Finally, the prots of the insider are lower than prots in Kyle-type models (models in whih
the market maker sees only the total order ow). Speially, the insider's expeted prots in
equilibrium equal,

0
=
((a  by)(y   
1
)z)
2
4
2
:
Substituting for q; 
1
and 
2
from Proposition 1, into 
0
, we obtain,
12
0
=
2(az
2

)
2

u
b
z
(
2
z
+ 4
2

)
2
: (5)
Thus as in JM, the inability of the insider to manipulate the real setor signal prevents him
from oseting the negative eet of the greater information release on his prots.
In the next setion, we disuss Cournot duopoly in the real setor and examine its eets on
the real and nanial variables when the manager of one rm trades in its stok. We show that
ompetition with another rm in the real setor not only aets the real deisions but also the
nanial deisions.
3. COURNOT DUOPOLY IN THE REAL SECTOR
In this setion, we introdue another rm that ompetes with the insider in the real setor.
For the sake of onveniene, let the insider-managed rm be rm 1 and the ompetitor be rm
2. For simpliity, rm 2 is assumed to be a standard neolassial rm (privately held) with its
nanial deisions ignored. The aim is to examine the eet of ompetition in the real setor on
how insider trading by the manager of rm 1 aets the real prie and quantity produed and the
stok prie, stok priing rule and its informativeness. We also want to examine the eet on the
insider's prots.
We assume that rms 1 and 2 ompete in the real setor by hoosing output. Thus the
insider now hooses real output to be produed by rm 1 as well as the amount of the stok of
rm 1 that he wants to buy or sell, based on his private informtion about rm 1's value.
Denoting rm i's output by y
i
, the inverse demand funtion for the real good an be written
as:
(10)
q
0
= (a  b(y
1
+ y
2
))z: (6)
where z is a normally distributed variable with mean z (assumed to be stritly positive) and
variane 
2
z
as in the prie-hoosing monopolist model above.
(10)
For onveniene, we ontinue to use symbols a and b to denote the interept and the slope of the demand
funtion in the monopoly and duopoly models. Other notation is also kept the same wherever possible.
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Firm 2 maximizes its expeted prots by hoosing y
2
. The expeted prots are
(11)

2
= (a  b(y
1
+ y
2
))y
2
z:
While rm 2 maximizes its prots by hoosing how muh to produe, the manager of rm 1, that
is, the insider, maximizes his prots by hoosing how muh to produe and how muh stok to
trade. The insider's prots therefore are
 = E
u
E

((v   p)x) +Bzx:
where
v = (a  b(y
1
+ y
2
))y
1
z  Bz; (7)
and Bz is the manager's ompensation reeived from the rm's owner per unit of the stok traded,
B being the anlagoue of A from the monopoly model of the previous setion.
(12)
In the nanial market, the stok of rm 1, managed by the insider, is traded. The prie of
this stok, p is set by a market maker onditional on his information and is taken as given by the
insider. The struture of the nanial market is the same as assumed in the monopoly models.
That is, the market maker sets the stok prie given his information, to make zero expeted prots.
Information Struture: We assume that z is assumed to be privately known to the manager of
rm 1. The market maker and the rival rm only know the distribution of z. Further, the market
maker gets his information from observing the total order ow made up as before of the insider's
stok order and of the noise trade. We denote this by . However, instead of the noisy observation
of output produed, as in the monopoly model of setion 2, we assume that the market maker sees
a noisy observation, denoted by q
(13)
of the prie of the real good, q
0
.
The signal q is dened as follows:
(11)
If z = 0, rm 2's prots are identially zero and the model redues to the monopoly model.
(12)
It is easy to verify that this form of the ompensation sheme for the manager/insider ontinues to be
indispensable in order to ensure the existene of an equilibrium. The sheme ensures that a seond order ondition
for the existene of maximum is satised.
(13)
Thus this model diers from the output-hoosing monopolymodel of JM only in one respet, namely the market
struture in the real setor. In partiular, there is no dierene in the types of signals available to the market maker.
However, we will see that the dierene in market struture has signiant impliations for informational eÆieny
of the stok prie and the prots of the insider.
14
q = (a  b(y
1
+ y
2
))(z + ); (8)
where  is normally distriubted with mean 0 and variane 
2

and is independent of z and u. We
assume that the insider does not see  or z + .
Setting the Stok Prie Funtion:
The zero prot ondition for the market maker then redues to
p = E(v=q; ):
We again look for a linear equilibrium and onjeture that the stok prie p is set to be linear in
the signals:
p = E(v=q; ) = 
0
+ 
1
q + 
2
: (9)
Substituting for v from (7) and p from (9), in the insider's prot funtion, we an write down his
maximization problem as follows:
Maximize

1
= ((a  b(y
1
+ y
2
))y
1
z  Bz   
0
+ 
1
(a  b(y
1
+ y
2
))z   
2
x)x +Bzx
by hoosing y
1
and x.
Solving for Equilibrium
The rst order ondition for rm 2's maximization problem is:
z(a  by
1
  2by
2
) = 0:
This yields
y
2
=
a  by
1
2b
: (10)
The rst order onditions for the insider's maximization problem are:
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zx(a  by
2
  2by
1
+ 
1
b) = 0
and
(a   b(y
1
+ y
2
))(y
1
  
1
)z   
0
  2
2
x = 0:
Simplifying leads to
y
1
=
a  by
2
+ 
1
b
2b
(11)
and
x =
(a  b(y
1
+ y
2
))(y
1
  
1
)z   
0
2
2
: (12)
Substituting for y
2
from (10) into (11), we obtain
y
1
=
a+ 2
1
b
3b
: (13)
Substituting this bak into (10), we obtain
y
2
=
a  
1
b
3b
: (14)
Note that y
1
and y
2
are deterministi and therefore x is linear in z. Thus we have the following
ounterpart of lemma 1.
Lemma 1
0
: The random variables v, q and  are jointly normally distributed.
Also note that the total output produed by the two rms equals
Y  y
1
+ y
2
=
2a+ b
1
3b
: (15)
Next we need to solve for the stok priing funtion. Using probability theory (Theorem 3.10
of Graybill (1961), as in setion 2), we an easily solve for the oeÆients 
0
; 
1
and 
2
. First note
that setting the ompensation sheme oeÆient B =
(a b(y
1
+y
2
))(y
1
 
1
)
2
yields 
0
= 0. This is
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neessary for the existene of equilibrium (as in setion 2) sine one of the seond order onditions
for the insider's maximization problem requires that
zx > 0:
Substituting 
0
= 0 into (12) and then substituting for x in the above seond order ondition
yields
z
(a  b(y
1
+ y
2
))(y
1
  
1
)z
2
2
> 0: (16)
We will show that 
1
and 
2
are suh that this seond order ondition is satised.
The following lemma (the ounterpart of Lemma 2 of setion 2) presents the solution for the
stok prie funtion:
Lemma 2
0
:
(i)

1
=
a
2
z
b(
2
z
+ 3
2

)
(ii)

2
=
a
2


3
p
3b
u
p
(1  k)
3
k
where
k =

2
z

2
z
+ 3
2

:
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2 (in the appendix) and is thus omitted.
Note that 
1
2 (0;
a
b
) and 
2
> 0 and thus (16) is satised. Thus the same type of om-
pensation sheme that we used in the monopolisti models is suÆient in the duopoly model as
well to ensure the existene of an equilibrium. The next proposition presents the unique linear
equilibrium of the model.
Proposition 2: A linear equilibrium exists. The equilibrium is unique and is haraterized by the
following values of variables x; y
1
; y
2
and p:
y
1
=
a+ 2b
1
3b
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y2
=
a  b
1
3b
x =
(a  b(y
1
+ y
2
))(y
1
  
1
)z
2
2
p = 
1
q + 
2

where for
k =

2
z

2
z
+ 3
2

;

1
=
ak
b
and

2
=
a
2


3
p
3b
u
p
(1  k)
3
k
Corollary 1: For m denoting the monopoly model of JM,
(i) 
1
> 
m
1
and 
2
< 
m
2
,
(ii) y
1
< y,
(iii) Y > y and
(iv) x = x
m
.
Proof: Reall (from setion 2, Proposition 1) that
(14)

m
1
=
a
2
z
b(
2
z
+ 4
2

)
:
Comparing this value with 
1
given by Proposition 2, it follows that 
1
< 
m
1
: A similar omparison
of 
m
2
from setion 2, Proposition 1, results in (i).
For (ii), we reprodue the JM result:
y =
a+ b
m
1
2b
:
Comparing y
1
given by Proposition 2 and using (i) yields (ii). Similarly, omparing Y given by
(15) with the expression for y above, and using (i) yields (iii). Finally, for (iv), substituting for y
1
,
Y , 
1
and 
2
from Proposition 2 into the expression for x given in the same proposition yields
(14)
This is the same value as in JM, exept that the oeÆients a and b are the parameters of the diret demand
funtion. For the purpose of omparison with Cournot duopoly outomes, the oeÆients are to be interpreted as
the parameters of the inverse demand funtion.
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x =

u
z

z
; (17)
whih is the same level as obtained in JM as well as in the monopoly model of setion 2.
Corollary 2: The output inrease in Cournot duopoly due to insider trading by one rm is less
than the output inrease in the output-hoosing monopoly model of JM.
Proof: The inreased output in the monopoly model of JM due to insider trading equals (see the
expression for y in orollary 1),
b
m
1
2b
:
The inrease in total output under Cournot duopoly is (see (15)),
b
1
3b
:
The result follows from Corollary 1(i).
Disussion of the Equilibrium: First of all, note that the total output produed by the two
rms is more than what is produed in a Cournot duopoly without insider trading. This is a
similar result to what we obtained in the output-hoosing monopoly model (and dierent from the
monopoly model of setion 2 for reasons disussed in that setion). However the inrease in output
is less than the inrease in output when there is monopoly in the real setor. The intuition is that
the insider is less able to inuene the market prie of the real good (and thus the signal available
to the market maker) by inreasing his rm's output. For eah added unit to the output, rm 2
redues its output, resulting in a relatively less lower prie than in the output-hoosing monopoly
model.
Seondly, note that the stok prie funtion is aeted by ompetition in the real setor, even
though the struture of the nanial market ontinues to be the same as in the monopoly models.
Speially, the response of the market maker to the signal from the real setor (that is 
1
) is
higher and the response to the total order ow signal (that is 
2
) is lower in Cournot duopoly (see
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Corollary 1(i)) than in JM. This result is in ontrast to the monopoly model of setion 2, where
the nanial variables remained ompletely unhanged despite the hange of the hoie variable.
The hange in the stok prie funtion reinfores the interrelationship between the real setor and
the nanial setor, as establihed in JM.
Third, the level of insider trading remains the same. Intuitively, this is due to the fat that
the eet of inreased output (as a result of an additional rm in the real setor) on the two signals
is `preditable' for the market maker (sine the outputs are deterministi) and thus is orretly
inorporated in the stok prie funtion (through lower weights on the two signals). Thus the
insider's optimal response remains unhanged.
The general properties of the stok priing funtion are the same as in the output hoos-
ing monopolist model of JM. For instane, the stok priing oeÆients for the two signals are
positive. The omparative statis of the Cournot duopoly model with respet to the real demand
parameters and the varianes of the random variables z,  and u, are also very similar. However,
there is a signiant respet in whih the duopoly model diers from the monopoly models. The
informativeness of the stok prie is greater in the duopoly model. We also show that the prots of
the insider are lower in the duopoly model than in JM, a result that emphasises the informational
link between the otherwise segmented markets. Finally, we onrm the JM result that the prots
of the insider are lower in the duopoly model with insider trading than in a Kyle-type model where
only the total order ow is observed by the market maker. These results are disussed below.
Informativeness of Stok Prie: We show below that the stok prie reveals more information
when there is Cournot duopoly in the real setor than when there is monopoly in the real setor.
In JM, we showed that even in the monopoly model, adding another signal from the real setor for
the market maker had the eet of inreasing information revelation more than in the Kyle-type
models (See for example Kyle (1985) and Rohet-Vila (1994), where the information revealed is
exatly half of what the insider knows.). The ompetition in the real setor makes the stok prie
even more informative. Further, as in JM, the amount of information revealed ontinues to vary
with some of the underlying parameters, in ontrast to Kyle, for instane. This reets the inability
of the insider to manipulate the signal from the real setor, in ontrast to the total order ow.
A measure of informativeness when we deal with multivariate normal distributions is the
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onditional variane of the value of the rm given the information of the market maker. The lower
the onditional variane, the higher the information ontent of the stok prie. In our set-up, this
an be written down as: (See Graybill (1961).)
Var(v=q; ) = 
2
v
  
1

vq
  
2

v
:
This redues to
(a  b
1
)
2
v
2(a+ 2b
1
)
: (18)
Note that the oeÆient of 
2
v
is less than half. Thus the stok prie here reveals more information
than in Kyle (1985) and Rohet and Vila (1994). We show below that the information revelation
is even greater than in the monopoly models of insider trading with a real setor (as in JM and
the model of setion 2).
Proposition 3: The stok prie reveals more information when there is Cournot duopoly in the
real setor than when there is monopoly in the real setor.
Proof: Reall that the onditional variane of value of the rm in the monopoly model of JM or
equivalently in the monopoly model of setion 2,
(15)
equals
(a  b
m
1
)
2m
v
2(a+ b
m
1
)
where, as earlier, the supersript m denotes monopoly. Comparing the oeÆient of 
2m
v
in this
expression with the oeÆient of 
2
v
in (18), gives us the result.
(16)
Thus ompetition in the real setor makes the stok prie more revealing. This is intuitive.
The insider does not have omplete ontrol over the hoie of real output and the prie of the real
good. Thus he is not able to manipulate the signal q as eetively as in the monopoly models of
JM and of setion 2.
(15)
Sine the informativeness of the stok prie is equal in the prie-hoosing monopoly model presented in setion
2 and in the output-hoosing monopoly model of JM, we onne the referene to the JM model.
(16)
Obviously, the value of the rm as well as the value of the oeÆient 
1
are dierent in the two models. But
that is irrelevant for the proposition. We are interested in the fration of variane explained by the stok prie.
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Also note in (18) that the oeÆient of 
2
v
depends on 
1
whih in turn depends negatively on

2

and positively on 
2
z
(see Proposition 2). This implies that the amount of information revealed
varies with 
2

and 
2
z
, a result similar to JM and in ontrast to Kyle.
Insider's Prots:
Now we present two properties of the insider's prots. First, we show that the insider's
prots under the Cournot duopoly model are less than those under the monopoly model of JM.
Note that this is dierent from the standard result of lower Cournot duopoly prots ompared to
monopoly prots. In our ontext, the omparison is not in the market where the market struture
diers. Instead, we are omparing the prots of the insider, whih are purely nanial, under two
dierent market strutures in the real setor. Thus our result is that even when the struture of
the nanial market ontinues to be the same, a dierent market struture in another good has
an eet on the outome of the nanial trading by the insider. This result is similar in spirit to
other results that show that even when markets are segmented, if one rm operates in all of those
markets, the outomes are interrelated. (See Jain and Mirman (1999) and Eaton and Mirman
(1991).)
Then we show that the insider's prots under Cournot duopoly as obtained in our model
(with two orrelated signals of value for the market maker) are less than the insider's prots under
Cournot duopoly but with only the total order ow as the signal for the market maker. This is
similar to what we showed in JM. Thus regardless of the informativeness of the signal from the
real setor for the market maker, the prots of the insider are less than in a Kyle-type model with
only one signal (namely, the total order ow). As mentioned earlier, this is due to the insider's
inability to manipulate the signal from the real setor and thus a greater release of information
through the stok prie.
In order to prove these two properties, we rst alulate the prots of the insider under
Cournot duopoly (with two signals for the market maker) in equilibrium. Substituting for y
1
, y
2
,
x and 
0
from Proposition 2 in the insider's prot funtion, we obtain
 =
(a  b
1
)
4
z
2
324b
2

2
:
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Now substituting for 
1
and 
2
, these prots beome
 =
a
2

u
(
2

)
2
z
2
3b
z
(
2
z
+ 3
2

)
2
:
Denote the insider's prots in the monopoly equilibrium of JM and of setion 2, by 
m
.
Then

m
=
2a
2

u
(
2

)
2
z
2
b
z
(
2
z
+ 4
2

)
2
:
A omparison of  and 
m
yields the following result:
Proposition 4:  < 
m
:
Next, we ompute the prots of the insider in a modied version of our Cournot duopoly
model. We assume that now the market maker only observes the total order ow. Everything else
remains unhanged in the model. We onsider this a Kyle-type model sine only one soure of
information is allowed to the market maker and thus there is no eet of nanial trading on the
real deisions.
Firm 2's problem ontinues to be the same as earlier in the paper. Also, the insider still
maximizes the following prot funtion:
 = E[(v   p)x+B
0
zx℄:
where v = (a   b(y
1
+ y
2
))y
1
z   B
0
z. As in our main model, a ompensation sheme is needed
to ensure the existene of a linear equilibrium.
(17)
This model is the same as the duopoly model
presented in this paper. However, the stok prie p is now set as follows:
p = E(v=) = 
o
+ 
2
:
assuming linearity.
We skip the details of the analysis sine they are very similar to Kyle (1985) and simply
report the prots (denoted by 
k
) in equilibrium:
(17)
Even when the prie is not a soure of information, our ompensation sheme is required for the existene of
an equilibrium.
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k
=
a
2
z
2

u
18b
z
:
Comparing it with  yields the following proposition:
Proposition 5:  < 
k
Thus as one would expet, the prots of the insider ontinue to be lower than when the
market maker only observes the total order ow. That is, a higher information revelation, as
shown in Proposition 3 (sine the information revealed in the benhmark Kyle-type model is also
exatly half), leads to lower prots under Cournot duopoly in the real setor, a result similar to
the monopoly models.
4. CONCLUSION:
In this paper, we have shown that the market struture in the real setor matters in how
insider trading aets the informativeness of the stok prie as well as the real variables. Market
struture in the real setor also has signiant eets on the formation of stok pries and the level
of insider prots. These eets are important ingredients in determining the soial desirability of
insider trading.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 2
We use Theorem 3.10, Graybill to determine the oeÆients 
0
, 
1
and 
2
.
First, note that,

0
= v   
1
y   
2
(x+ 0):
Substituting for v from (1), y = (a  bq)(z + ), A =
(a bq)(q 
1
)
2
and x from (4), we obtain

0
= 0:
The oeÆients 
1
and 
2
are given by the following equation:
(
1

2
) = (
vy

v
)


2
y

y

y

2


 1
:
Multiplying the matries yields,

1
=

vy

2

  
v

y

2
y

2

  (
y
)
2
;

2
=

v

2
y
  
vy

y

2
y

2

  (
y
)
2
:
Substituting for the various varianes and ovarianes, we obtain the following two equations:

1
=
(a   bq)
2
q
2
z

2
u
D
; (19)

2
=
(a  bq)
4
q(q   
1
)
2
z

2

2
2
D
; (20)
where
D = Det


2
y

y

y

2


:
Substituting for the varianes and ovarianes in this matrix and simplifying the expression for the
determinant yields,
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D = (a  bq)
2
(
2
u
(
2
z
+ 
2

)) +
(a  bq)
4
(q   
1
)
2

2
z

2

4
2
2
: (21)
Simplifying (19) and (20) yields,
2
2
2
=
(a  bq)
2
(q   
1
)
2


1

2
u
: (22)
Substituting for D from (21) into (20) and then simplifying, we obtain,
2
2
2
=
(a  bq)
2
q(q   
1
)
2


2
z

2
z

2
u
+ 
2

(
(a bq)
2
(q 
1
)
2

2
z
4
2
2
+ 
2
u
)
:
Simplifying further yields,
2
2
2
=
(a  bq)
2
(q   
1
)
2


2
z
(q + 
1
)
2
2
u
(
2
z
+ 
2

)
: (23)
Solving (22) and (23), we get,
2(
2
z
+ 
2

)
1
= 
2
z
(q + 
1
):
Substituting for y and simplifying further to solve for 
1
, we obtain,

1
=
a
2
z
b(
2
z
+ 4
2

)
:
Substituting this bak into (22) and taking the positive square root, we get,

2
=
a
2


4b
u
p
(1  k)
3
k;
where
k =

2
z

2
z
+ 4
2

:
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